I. INTRODUCTION
Trade mark law is often thought of as concerned with trade and commerce. But it is also rooted in history and culture and in some instances reflects deeply embedded cultural conflicts as between different imagined communities. In this chapter we focus on two Australian nostalgia labels that demonstrate the point in an especially poignant way. The first lay at the centre of In the Matter of Burgoyne's Trade Mark, 1 a case decided at the height of the British Empire, where an English judge held that the trade mark 'Oro' applied to a wine imported from Thomas Hardy's vineyard in South Australia might mean 'choice' to an Australian Aboriginal (in fact it was already noted in colonial records as denoting 'good' to the Dieri people of South Australia) but was 'meaningless' to the 'ordinary Englishman' in Britain.
2 So it could be entered as a trade mark on the nascent United Kingdom trade marks register. A little over a century later, a revived 'Oomoo' label was registered as a trade mark for Hardy's wine in Australia, 3 at the same time that a government-sponsored programme for recovering the endangered Dieri language was under way in the place from which the wine was sourced. The principle that a foreign-language expression without 'ordinary signification' in Australia can be registered as a trade mark was more recently relied on by the High Court in Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Modena Trading Pty Ltd 4 to hold that 'Oro', meaning 'gold' in Italian and in common use by Italian coffee traders in Australia, was validly registered to Cantarella. 5 Thus, a standard that became entrenched in Australia during the era of its White Australia policy resolves an issue as to a trade mark entitlement to a symbol widely associated with an Italian tradition of coffee in modern Australia. 6 We argue that in these examples the legal treatment of labels applied to wine and coffee in Australia replicates the complicated histories of the products. And we question whether the 'ordinary signification' of language to some 'ordinary' English-speaker should be the measure of a trade mark in a country which prides itself on being both multicultural and respectful of the highly diverse languages and traditions of its Indigenous peoples, proposing instead that the trade mark register should do more than passively reflect the inherited cultural tensions of an earlier period. In short, the rules governing trade mark registration should be treated as part of a thoroughly modern cultural and economic trade mark law policy.
The chapter is arranged as follows. In Sections II and III we trace the roots of the Anglo-Australian inherent distinctiveness standard, arguing that it reflected a cultural policy of (predominantly) English language preservation fashioned in the hands of Victorian judges in Britain, which was then adopted wholesale by Australian judges in post-colonial Australia. In Sections IV and V we consider reforms in other parts of the Anglosphere, including the American doctrine of foreign equivalents and the equal treatment principle applied to Māori in New Zealand -and we conclude that, while introducing reforms modelled on these overseas experiments, for instance adopting a doctrine of foreign equivalents along 8 Ibid [286] (Crennan J) ('Whilst the prime concern of the Trade Marks Act is with the capacity of a trade mark to distinguish the goods of the registered owner from those of another trader, trade marks undoubtedly perform other functions'), including as an indicium of quality and through their ability to advertise the products. economic in nature and function continues to be maintained despite a growing body of marketing, sociological, anthropological, cultural, linguistic and legal recognition that these signs may 'represent a variety of ideas and attributes' to the audience.
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That it is a long-established position no doubt helps in entrenching its status. It can be traced back to the utilitarianism of the late nineteenth century, when the British trade mark registration system was established over a period of roughly 30 years, 13 serving also as a model for the colonies.
14 It was embodied, for instance, in leading textbook-writer Kerly's statement in 1894 that a 'trade mark' consists of 'a symbol applied or attached to goods offered for sale in the market, so as to distinguish them from similar goods, and to identify them with a particular trader', 15 a statement substantially repeated in later editions throughout the twentieth century. 16 And while the focus in the nineteenth century may have been more on the advantages for traders of being able to efficiently signify the source of their products in a mass-market economy and thus capture benefits from their labours in trade, 17 consuming public would also benefit from their ability to identify traders' products. 18 The basic understanding that the interests of traders and consumers converge in the economic benefits of a system that promotes the adoption, registration and use of trade marks to indicate a trading source thus became established when brands themselves were becoming a central feature of the vast capitalist system of trade stretching across the British world.
19
Nevertheless, there was one domain in which judges in this period paid close attention to the social and cultural dimensions of trade marks from the beginning, albeit they did so in a rather restricted way. In a series of late nineteenth-century cases British judges treated the law's statutory requirements that a word should be 'fancy', 'invented', non-descriptive (as in 'a word or words having no direct reference to the character or quality of the goods') or otherwise 'distinctive', in order to be registered, 20 as more than simply an attempt to predict a trade mark's ability to distinguish a particular trader's goods from those of other traders through use and without the benefit of registration. Indeed the ordinary Englishman's knowledge may well have exceeded that of even the average middle-class Englishman at times, as in that case where the ordinary Englishman's deemed knowledge that 'Boköl' and 'Bokøl' were Scandinavian words for beer meant these could not be registered as a trade mark for beer in the United Kingdom.
28 Indeed, there is plenty in the cases to support the idea that 'the ordinary Englishman' was a device that enabled Victorian judges to frame and further a policy of protecting a traditional body of English and other languages that judges wanted to treat as available to ordinary -or at least ordinary middle-class -Englishmen from appropriation.
There are other respects in which the Victorian judges' standard relying on 'the ordinary Englishman' seems removed from the way that some groups understood language. That a modern language might develop new significances was still a radical idea put forward by Ferdinand 33 and the expressive line-drawings of Walter Crane, noted British artist and book illustrator, who in 1900 already talked of the line as 'a language, a most vigorous and sensitive speech of many dialects, which can adapt itself to all purposes' in the hands of an artist, unleashing 'a great range of expression'.
34 Nevertheless, the Victorian judges' focus on 'distinctiveness' remained squarely on the traditional meaning of common words 'appropriated' and deployed by traders for their exclusive use, with the only effect the judges were prepared to imagine being that a word previously used to describe a range of things was now being used to describe a trader's products specifically. 35 In the process, 'the ordinary Englishman' becomes not just a middle-class person who was surprisingly knowledgeable in many languages, but also a rather conservative, literal-minded type in his reaction to the treatment of language in some already-becoming-modern advertising and artistic practices.
Indeed, as late as 1909, almost a decade after Crane wrote of language as expressive and adaptable in the hands of the artist, Cozens Hardy MR was still insisting that '[w]ealthy traders are habitually eager to enclose Cf the common law where 'secondary meaning' was accepted as a bulwark against deceptive practices: see Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 199 (HL) 210-11 (Lord Herschell) ('words forming part of the common stock of language, may become so far associated with the goods of a particular maker that it is capable of proof that the use of them by themselves without explanation or qualification by another manufacturer would deceive its purchaser into the belief that he was getting the goods of A, when he was really getting the goods of B').
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Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/01/2019 07:16:25PM via free access part of the great common of the English language and to exclude the general public of the present day and of the future from access to the inclosure'. 36 Furthermore, 'a mere laudatory epithet' such as 'Perfection', despite its use on 'millions of cakes sold' of Crosfield's soap over many years, 37 was not, in his opinion, 'capable of being registered [as a trade mark]' on the basis that it 'ought to be open to all the world'. 38 The other judges in the case referenced the word's 'ordinary' or 'common' descriptive and laudatory meaning, as denoting literally perfection, 39 to conclude that it should not be allowed to be withdrawn from its 'primary and proper meaning . . . to make it mean "Crosfields" instead of "perfect"'. Apparently, the 'ordinary' meaning of 'Perfection' did not take into account the way the word was already being used in advertising (see Figure 1 .1) to convey not a precise sense of literal perfection but a more symbolic sense of a wonderful cleanliness in association with Crosfield's soap, in the same way that Crosfield's competitors used 'Matchless Cleanser' and 'Sunlight' to convey a sense of magical cleanliness loosely connected with their soaps.
41
The growing artistic and advertising reliance on symbolic meaning also helps us to understand the advertising uses of indigenous languages of the colonies in the labels applied to products sourced for British markets around the fin de siècle, refashioning their meaning to suit the traders' purposes of communicating their own selected symbolic meanings to their selected audiences. In the same way that leading artists from Van Gogh to Toulouse-Lautrec and Picasso were creatively adapting Oriental and later African and Oceanic symbols, with little regard to their original symbolic meanings, 42 so apparently 'meaningless' indigenous words and imagery were being repurposed by advertisers (sometimes using the same artists) as labels, advertisements and posters in the late Victorian and early Edwardian period -ensuring that 'scenes of empire [entered] into every corner of the home, stamping images of colonial conquest on soap boxes, matchboxes, biscuit tins, whiskey bottles, tea tins and chocolate bars'; or as Anne McClintock neatly summarises it, it was a period of 'imperial kitsch as consumer spectacle'. 43 We might want to challenge this characterisation of kitschness, although it is a label that more generally has been applied to the art of this period and not without some justification. 44 In fact, the involvement of artists in designing labels, posters and advertisements ensured the artistic quality of advertising could be very high, as with the elegant lines and imagery of Farwell LJ at 151); as such, the case represented a transitional moment between the nineteenth-century language protection cases and the pro-competition focus of later cases such as Du Cros (n 21). As Fahr-Becker (n 42) 7 points out, the Art Nouveau style of this period that many now celebrate as 'the beginning of the Modern Style' has also had its share of detractors, who have dismissed it as 'ornamental hell, kitch, and arts and crafts'.
Toulouse-Lautrec's advertising posters, 45 and the colourful posters, labels and other advertising material produced by commercial lithographer Charles Troedel's company in Melbourne, Australia, which, in the words of Amanda Scardamaglia, demonstrated 'great artistic merit and honoured the style of the French Belle Époque in the 1890s'. 46 Nevertheless, the aims and effects of the colonial advertising practices often seemed quite different from the practices of other artist/advertisers whose broader purpose was to create a genuinely 'modern style'. 47 While the latter were at the vanguard of the transition to twentieth-century modernism, colonial advertising practices seemed designed to give consumers the impression that they could enjoy the luxurious experience of living at the centre of a vast colonising enterprise dedicated to providing them with exotic products without having to think too hard about the methods that had been employed in making this possible. Thus we see the beginning of nostalgia labels used to promote and reinforce the idea of the product as 'an unalloyedly blissful substance, except that we wrongfully forget that it is also the product of an expropriation '. 48 How did the courts treat these practices in the trade mark cases involving indigenous language and imagery that came before them in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the very beginning of the next one? We have already noted how, on the one hand, Victorian and later Edwardian judges treated European languages as within the ordinary Englishman's knowledge, so descriptive words in these languages were precluded from trade mark registration in the same way as English ones.
49
On the other hand, 'the ordinary Englishman's' deemed lack of knowledge of 'barbarous language[s]', 50 meant that traders were left free by the law to pursue their practices of drawing on the languages and imagery of the indigenous peoples of the colonies in their advertising practices. Figure  1. 2) was woven into a rural scene featuring Australian flora and fauna to create an impression of unalloyed bucolic enjoyment (notably absent from which were any examples of Indigenous Australians occupying the land), was a 'fancy' word that could be registered as a trade mark by wine importer Peter Burgoyne.
Of course, it was not the Dieri people themselves who objected to the trade mark. Rather the objection that 'Oomoo' meant 'choice' in the 'aboriginal language of Australia' came from a competing wine importer, owner of the 'Emu' trade mark. 53 But Chitty J said that the word, ' manufactured out of four "o's" and one "m"', was 'meaningless' to 'an ordinary Englishman, or a sufficient number of Englishman in this country', as evidenced by the fact that 'nobody that I know has ever asked for "a glass of Oomoo"'. 54 In this brief passing comment, 'the ordinary Englishman' takes on a further dimension of representing a particular type of English wine-drinking gentleman to be a proper exemplar of public opinion as to what languages should count and which could be dismissed as 'meaningless', with no need to consider apparently the way that the bucolic message of Australian enjoyment has been carefully constructed though the use of Indigenous language combined with Australian imagery. Indeed, the language of 'meaninglessness' adopted in this context, a term evoking an idea of terra nullius, serves as another reminder of the difficulty 'indigenous groups faced in negotiating for themselves a place in the British world'.
55
The reasoning of Chitty J in Burgoyne can be contrasted with that of Kay J in Jackson Co's Trade Mark, 56 decided earlier in the same year. In this case the onomatopoeic American Indian word 'Kokoko', meaning 'owl' in the language of the Chippewa, was treated as equivalent to the English word 'owl' in signifying the figure of an owl, which, being common in the cotton trade, was accepted to be precluded from registration under the statute. 57 An unusual feature of the case was a clever demonstration of a new technology, a phonograph on which a wax cylinder made by Thomas Edison containing an ethnographic recording of the sound of a Chippewa Indian war-cry imitating the owl's screech was played in court, 58 to the tremendous excitement of those present -and showing, as one newspaper said, 'how valuable and important may be the part which Mr Edison's remarkable discovery may yet play in social and commercial life'. 59 Thus it was already evident to this audience that 'Kokoko' was not just a word in Chippewa language denoting an 'owl', but was also accorded a particular symbolic function in Chippewa culture that could be preserved and recorded by virtue of the phonograph. Further, responding to the company's argument that 'Kokoko' was a word unknown in the cotton trade in Britain, Kay J held that the possibility of cotton trade with the Chippewa developing in the future could not be ruled out and, for that potential audience at least, the prospect of 'Kokoko' being understood as a descriptive word could not be ruled out. 60 For his part, Chitty J in Burgoyne was quick to dismiss such an argument on the basis that 'as to there growing up a trade in "Oomoo" with the Aborigines of the Australian Continent, I think that is far-fetched, and a great deal too fanciful a notion for me, sitting here as a Judge, to proceed upon'. 61 We have not been able to find any record of the 'Oomoo' label being registered to Burgoyne in the United Kingdom register (although that may have more to do with the hole in the archive than with any actual decision not to register the trade mark, despite his having gone to court to proclaim his entitlement to do so) 62 -and nor was it registered in the name of Hardy in South Australia around the same period, although it seems likely that the 'Oomoo' label in question in the Burgoyne case, designed and printed by the Chas Troedel lithographic company for Thomas Hardy's winery, was intended for use also in Australia.
63 But the reasoning of Chitty J that obscure languages from Aboriginal Australia, or 'say, from the centre of Africa', 64 were meaningless to the 'ordinary Englishman' and thus could be freely entered on the register, set the tone for later cases. Six years later, in Densham and Sons' Trade Mark, 65 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Romer J that 'Mazawattee', a word composed from 'Mazadhar', meaning 'luscious' in Hindi, and 'Wattee', meaning 'garden' in Sinhalese, was a validly registered trade mark for tea imported from Ceylon. The 'Oomoo' label along with the 'Emu' label form part of the Troedel archive at the State Library of Victoria. The authority of Jackson was raised in this case but Romer J said that he was rather inclined to think that 'the Chippeway Indians might have been left to take care of themselves'; ibid 82. might think that the firm's advertisements of its tea as coming from 'the sweet-scented island of Ceylon, which produces the most luscious tea in the world' 67 might have made the symbolic meaning of luscious colonial cultivation obvious to at least some of the consuming public in Britain, even aside from those who through education or experience might have known the Hindi and/or Sinhalese languages. Nevertheless, Romer J, who as Romer QC had argued for registration of 'Oomoo' before Chitty J in Burgoyne, held that 'Mazawattee' was a 'meaningless' invented word; and his decision was upheld without any apparent difficulty on appeal.
68
By the time the House of Lords came to determine the distinctiveness of the Eastman company's trade mark 'Solio' for photographic paper, 69 Lord Herschell could confidently state that the English language was 'common property' and 'no one ought to be prevent the other members of the community from using [it] for purposes of description'; 70 although he thought the same might be extended to foreign words -and more generally questioned whether 'meaninglessness' was necessarily the proper standard here. 71 He made an exception for 'words from languages so little known in this country that it would suggest no meaning except to a few scholars'. Ibid (at least for invented words). Thus the 'newly coined' word 'Solio', despite its derivation from the Latin word 'sol' for sun and hint at the process of development involving the use of sunlight, could be registered.
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Ibid 581. Cf Lord Macnaghten at 583 ('no objection that [an invented word] may be traced to a foreign source'). principal standard in Australia, supplemented by the economic standard propounded in Du Cros. 73 These cases, all decided in a time of the White Australia Policy, are still regarded as authoritative. They provide the backdrop of the 'inherent distinctiveness' standard in section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), a standard relied on to allow registration of a trade mark without the benefit of actual or potential use and thus substantially less onerous for a potential registrant than the other standards of 'distinctiveness' permitted under the Act (which require evidence of actual or intended use). 74 In an ironic return to Victorian decision-making, in 2006 'Oomoo' was registered as an inherently distinctive trade mark for a revived brand of Hardy's wine after a lengthy period of disuse. its provision for protection of indigenous 'cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions '. 77 Likewise, in 2014 in Cantarella, 78 the High Court held that 'Oro', meaning 'gold' in Italian, and a common sight on coffee packets circulated by Italian coffee traders in Australia, 79 was validly registered as an inherently distinctive trade mark for Cantarella Bros' Vittoria coffee in 2000, 80 on the basis of the word's 'ordinary [lack of] signification' to the public in Australia -notwithstanding a post-war Italian diaspora which has been active in the coffee industry with the result that coffee is now widely viewed as 'a regional cultural icon', 81 the popularity of Italian language programmes, including in schools and universities, and a long-standing official government policy of non-discrimination on grounds of race extending to 'economic, social and cultural rights'. 82 In assessing knowledge of Italian in Australia, the Court relied on a finding of Emmett J at first instance that only 'a very small minority' understood the meaning of 'Oro' on the evidence available -most notably Census data from 2006 suggesting that those speaking Italian at home in Australia were less than 2 per cent of the Australian population. 83 This demographic fragment was scarcely enough if the purpose was to assess whether 'particular words that are intended to constitute the trade mark are sufficiently well understood in Australia', as Emmett J posited.
84 Indeed, our research conducted after the case suggests the number of those who understand may be nearer 10 per cent of the broader population, around 20 per cent for some quite sizable minority groups viz those familiar with Italian language and coffee Ibid [75] (The High Court disputed whether the evidence of the other trade uses of 'Oro' on coffee packets was sufficient to prove that 'the word "Oro", standing alone, is understood in Australia by persons concerned with coffee products to be to be directly descriptive of the character or quality of the goods'). 'aficionados' (that is, those serious about coffee as measured by their preference for coffee made from beans/grounds), and more than 50 per cent of the relatively small number of those of Italian background.
85 But, as there was no evidence specifically directed to the latter point put forward in the case itself, the Census data on Italian-speaking became the barometer of public knowledge of Oro's 'meaning' in Australia. The results of the survey are presented in Table 1 .1.
At the same time, the Court appeared anxious to distance itself from any suggestion that it was using a standard of an ordinary English language speaker, preferring the neutral-sounding 'ordinary signification' to those 'concerned with' coffee in Australia, 'a familiar beverage consumed by many'. 86 Yet it preferred 'the many' in Australia over other imagined communities -unlike Gageler J, in dissent, who noted that in Australia coffee is 'commonly associated with Italy, often enough imported from Italy and often enough sold to Italian speakers', and supported the 'multicultural' approach of the full Federal Court in taking into account the language of coffee traders as explaining their legitimate choices to use 'Oro' on their packages. 87 At the same time, the Court also made clear that 'allusive or metaphysical meaning' can be disregarded in assessing 85 In this research, conducted in September 2015 with the Pureprofile online survey company, we surveyed 250 adult people across Australia, asking questions inter alia about their consumption of coffee (around 80% of respondents); whether they bought coffee as beans or grounds (as a measure of coffee aficionado status) or in convenience forms, or did not buy coffee; what they thought the word 'Oro' meant on the package; why they thought 'Oro' was on the package (in other words, the symbolic value they attributed to the word 'Oro'); whether they had an Italian background and whether they understood the Italian language from 'a little' to 'perfectly'. 'ordinary signification'. 88 And so the allusive symbolic meaning that 'Oro' may have for some audiences, which may help to explain its common use to denote pure or authentic Italian quality by Italian coffee traders in Australia, 89 was left out of account on this highly literal analysis. 90 As such, the Court's coded language of 'ordinary signification' fits the observation of Graeme Dinwoodie and Dev Gangjee that 'most efforts by courts [these days] to identify or construct consumers and the marketplace they inhabit are blended exercises that are part-empirical and part-normative'.
IV. TOWARDS A MODERN AUSTRALIAN CULTURAL POLICY
One of the difficulties with the part-normative standard adopted in the Cantarella case is that its starting point is a Victorian distinctiveness standard adopted when it was socially acceptable for a British judge to treat 'the ordinary Englishman' as the arbiter of meaning, endorsed without question in Australia during the era of the White Australia policy, and made the measure of the inherent distinctiveness of the 'Oro' coffee label in modern multicultural Australia. As Michael Handler points out, 'expressed at such a high level of generality, and by seeming to treat "anyone concerned with the goods" as an undifferentiated mass, the majority's interpretation of "signification" is not especially helpful in addressing a range of other, more complex situations'. 92 In this chapter we have argued that it was not especially helpful either in addressing the signification to be attributed to a common Italian word, commonly used and applied with respect to coffee products in Australia, to a range of publics. Nor was it especially helpful in addressing the registration of Hardy's 'Oomoo' wine label a few years earlier, relying on the by-then set- For instance, in our survey (n 85), some 20% of respondents, and nearer 30% of the identified minority groups of involved coffee consumers, indicated in response to our question about why 'Oro' was on the Vittoria package that it was used to signify 'Italian', 'authentic', 'fancy', 'pure' etc. 91 Dinwoodie and Gangjee (n 11) 339. Recall Lord Parker's language of the legitimate desire of other traders to use the same or a similar mark as the standard of distinctiveness, framed in terms of restricting barriers to entry; Du Cros (n 21).
94
Bearing in mind that if the focus of the economic standard is whether other traders are 'likely, in the ordinary course of their business and without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in connection with their own goods' (Du Cros (n 21) 635 (Lord Parker)), this kind of 'barriers to entry' standard should include not just other traders who now exist, but potential traders in the future. 95 for purposes inter alia of assessing inherent distinctiveness.
97 It may be feasible to introduce this doctrine into Australian law, whether by legislative amendment or by a more subtle change in judicial approach. Nevertheless, a great deal depends on how it is treated in practice by judges and other decision makers. For instance, some US judges have treated the doctrine as asking simply whether the 'ordinary American purchaser' would 'stop and translate', 98 an approach which seems little different from the current Australian standard of 'ordinary signification'.
99 And even on a more liberal interpretation, 'obscure' languages are generally not accorded protection. In one early case Selchow v Chaffee, 100 it was held with respect to 'Parcheesi', a popular game based on an ancient Indian game with a 'very similar ' name, that '[b] ecause the foreign name is known here to but a few to-day does not signify it will not be known to hundreds tomorrow and thousands next week and tens of thousands next month', using language reminiscent of the British Jackson case.
101 But since then the focus has been more on giving equivalent protection to already common (primarily European) languages. Native American Algonquin have not been accorded the protection.
102 Nor has Arabic, knowledge of which 97
The doctrine is also used to determine genericism and similarity of connotation in infringement cases: see Palm Bay Imports Inc v Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee (2005 ) 396 F 3d 1369 (Fed Circ) 1377 See Palm Bay Imports, ibid 1377 (Rader Circ J) ('it is improbable that the average American purchaser would stop and translate "VEUVE" into "Widow"', and thus the doctrine does not apply in this case where 'Veuve Royale' and 'the Widow' were being compared for similarity of connotation in an infringement case).
99
In a later attempt to soften its approach, the US Court of Appeals said the requirement of 'the ordinary American' translating meant 'all American purchasers, including those proficient in a non-English language who would ordinarily be expected to translate words into English': Re Spirits International NV ( was deemed 'negligible . . . according to Census data', 103 although Swahili on a range of evidence was treated as within the doctrine. 104 Similarly mixed results can be found in the United Kingdom -with, for instance, the Spanish expression 'El Canal de Las Estrellas' treated as equivalent to the English phrase 'The Channel of the Stars' in one decision, 105 but the Japanese word 'Kiku' (denoting 'Chrysanthemum') and a symbol of a globe, said to be 'a common sight' in Saudi Arabia, in other decisions deemed too obscure to be counted on the evidence available when it comes to assessing inherent distinctiveness.
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Thus, although the doctrine of foreign equivalents would be a step beyond the current Australian approach (and the approach in some European jurisdictions), 107 it might still end up being a rather modest step, depending on how it is construed. Certainly, as far as 'Oro' in Australia is concerned, a court following the current American or British approach and basing itself on Census data suggesting that less than 2 per cent of the population speaks Italian, might still conclude that Italian is an obscure 255 Conn 358, 371-2 (doctrine of foreign equivalents not applicable in assessing genericism of the disputed term 'Mohegan' on the basis that 'no sizable segment of the relevant public is likely to speak the Algonquin languages', and the word was generic as it had 'become synonymous in the English language with the unique Indian people commonly known by that name'). See also rather than a common European language. As to the fate of 'Oomoo', even on the best evidence about language dissemination of Dieri this is not a 'common' language. Indeed, for Indigenous languages something closer to a full equal treatment principle may offer a better guarantee that the language will be protected from appropriation as trade marks.
108 This is the position adopted in New Zealand with respect to Māori, based on the official status of the language under Māori Language Acts, although even then it was decisions of the Assistant Commissioner of Trade Marks that ensured that trade mark law would treat Māori the same way as English in assessing inherent distinctiveness -with the result that 'Kikorangi' and 'Kura', meaning 'blue' and 'red' in Māori, were held not inherently distinctive of blue cheese and yoghurt products (although the first was found distinctive on evidence of 11 years uninterrupted use by the well-known Kapiti Cheeses company). 109 In short, the effectiveness of modelling reform on American and New Zealand language equivalence approaches will depend on how high the threshold of language knowledge is treated by Australian decision makers, how ready they are to accept there may be multiple meanings, and how receptive they are to evidence of language knowledge in cases and disputes before them. 110 All we are saying here is that, as the history of the inherent distinctiveness standard has demonstrated, the scope and operation of any future legal standard will be a product not just of design and intention, but of the way that its language is ultimately construed -and construction will almost inevitably be at least partly a function of the policy choices of decision makers.
V. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have argued that there are a number of reasons, economic and cultural, to question whether a standard about the ordinary signification of language in Australia, a standard whose roots can be traced back to the language of the 'ordinary Englishman' of nineteenthcentury colonial Britain, is the best way to determine what should be entered on the trade mark register in modern Australia. We have suggested that Australian law makers, legislators and judges, and other decision makers alike, should now consider how the standard could be updated for a twenty-first-century modern Australia. As to efficiency, an approach that espouses the possibility that a few traders today may become more tomorrow and all should be taken into account in considering the prospect that a variety of traders will have legitimate interests in using certain language expressions for their competing products is surely preferable to one that privileges existing traders. As to culture, a standard that protects the common language of English-speaking people while allowing appropriation of the languages of Indigenous and minority groups fails to give account to the multiple imagined communities in which many people now live in Australia, and the aspirational norms of inclusion that this country espouses. On several counts, then, now is the time to move away from the nineteenth-century idea that a word's 'ordinary signification' should dictate the quality of a sign's trade mark-ness for multiple publics across multiple boundaries. 
